LIST OF PUBLICATIONS (updated August 2023)
NOTE: Downloading, copying, or printing
for, or on behalf of, any for-profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose
should not be done without the explicit permission of the corresponding
publisher.
Refereed Publications:
(61) Laplace Mermoud, D., M. Grabisch, and P.
Sudhölter (2023), “Minimal balanced collections and their
application to core stability and other topics of game theory”, Discrete
Applied Mathematics 341, 60-81, Download.
(60) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2023): “Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy
problems when agents merge or split”, Mathematical Social Sciences 125, 61-64, Download.
(59) Giménez-Gómez, J.-M., P.
Sudhölter, and C. Vilella (2023), “Average monotonic cooperative
games with nontransferable utility”, Mathematical Methods of
Operations Research 97, 383-390, Download.
(58) Béal, S., S. Gonzalez, P. Solal, and P.
Sudhölter (2023): “Axiomatic characterizations of the core without
consistency”, International Journal of Game Theory 52, 687 –
701, Download
(57) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter
(2021): “Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness”, online in Mathematical Programming,
26 pp., Download
(56) Dietzenbacher, B., and P. Sudhölter
(2022): “Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the
core in convex games”, International Journal of Game Theory 51,
413 – 429, Download
(55) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P.
Sudhölter (2021): “Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain
of convex games”, Journal of
Mathematical Economics 95, 102477 (10 pp.), Download
(54) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P.
Sudhölter (2021): “Constrained
welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems”, Mathematical Social Sciences 109, 45 – 51, Download
(53) Hokari, T., Y. Funaki, and P. Sudhölter (2020):
“Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex
games”, Review of Economic Design 24, 187 – 197, Download
(52) Calleja, P., F.
Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2020): “Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without
consistency”, Mathematics of Operations Research 45, 1056 – 68, Download
(51) Litan, C., F. Marhuenda, and P. Sudhölter (2020):
“Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix
outcome game forms”, Annals of Operations Research 287, 801
– 10, Download
(50) Gottschalk Marling, T., T. M. Range, P. Sudhölter, and L. P. Østerdal (2018): “Decomposing bivariate
dominance for social welfare comparisons”, Mathematical Social Sciences 95, 1 – 8, Download
(49) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2018): “On a class of
vertices of the core”, Games and
Economic Behavior 108, 541 – 57, Download
(48) Sudhölter, P., and J. M. Zarzuelo (2017):
“Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods”, European Journal of Operational Research 260, 161 – 70, Download
(47)
Kleppe, J., H. Reijnierse, and P. Sudhölter (2016): “Axiomatizations
of symmetrically weighted solutions”, Annals
of Operations Research 243, 37 – 53, Download
(46)
Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2016): “Characterizations of
solutions for games with precedence constraints”, International Journal of Game Theory 45, 269 – 90, Download
(45) Albizuri, M. J., and P. Sudhölter
(2016): “Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with
communication structures”, Social
Choice and Welfare 46, 451 – 75, Download
(44) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2015): “On bargaining sets
of convex NTU games”, International
Game Theory Review 17, 1550008 (7 pp.), Download
(43) Litan, C., F. Marhuenda, and P. Sudhölter (2015):
“Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 60, 28
– 32, Download
(42) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2014): “On the
restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices”,
European Journal of Operational Research
35, 709 – 17, Download
(41) Derks, J., H. Peters, and P. Sudhölter (2014): “On
extensions of the core and the anticore of
transferable utility games”, International Journal of Game Theory 43, 37
– 63, Download
(40) Khmelnitskaya, A., and P. Sudhölter
(2013): “The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures”, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
78, 285 – 99, Download
(39) Sudhölter, P., and J. M. Zarzuelo (2013): “Extending the
Nash solution to choice problems with reference points”, Games and Economic Behavior 80, 219
– 28, Download
(38) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2012): “The bounded core
for games with precedence constraints”, Annals of Operations Research 201, 251 – 64, Download
(37) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2012): “Nonsymmetric
variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus”,
International Journal of Game Theory
41, 809 – 28, Download
(36) Le Breton, M, P. Sudhölter, and V. Zaporozhets
(2012): “Sequential legislative lobbying”, Social Choice and Welfare 39, 491 – 520, Download
(35) Peleg, B., P. Sudhölter, and J. M. Zarzuelo (2012): “On
the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person
NTU games”, SERIEs 3, 143
– 56, Download
(34) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2010): “The positive core
of a cooperative game”, International
Journal of Game Theory 39, 113 – 36, Download
(33) Shellshear, E., and P. Sudhölter
(2009): “On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability”,
Games and Economic Behavior 67, 633
– 44, Download
(32) Holzman, R., B. Peleg, and P. Sudhölter (2007):
“Bargaining sets of majority voting games”, Mathematics of Operations Research 32, 857 – 72, Download
(31) Hoffmann, M., and P. Sudhölter (2007): “The Shapley
value of exact assignment games”, International
Journal of Game Theory 35, 557 – 68, Download
(30)
Raghavan, T. E. S., and P. Sudhölter (2006): “On assignment
games”, in Advances in Dynamic
Games with Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and
Environmental Management, ed. by A. Haurie, S.
Muto, L. A. Petrosjan, and T. E. S. Raghavan, vol. 8
of Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Birkhäuser,
pp. 163 – 79, Download
(29) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “On bargaining sets
and voting games”, in Proceedings of the Fourth Twente Workshop on
Cooperative Games joint with the 3rd Dutch-Russian Symposium, CTIT, University
of Twente, ed. by T.S.H. Driessen, J.B. Timmer, A.B. Khmelnitskaya,
89 – 104, Download
(28) Raghavan, T.E.S., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “The modiclus and core stability”, International Journal of Game Theory 33, 467 – 78, Download
(27) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “On the
non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining
set”, Journal of Mathematical
Economics 41, 1060 – 8, Download
(26) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2004): “Cartels
via the modiclus”, Discrete Applied Mathematics 134, 263 – 302, Download
(25) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2003): “Reconfirming the prenucleolus”, Mathematics
of Operations Research 28, 283 – 93, Download
(24) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2003): “The dummy paradox
of the bargaining set”, International
Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra 12, 443 – 6; also in
Game Theory and Applications 8, ed. by L. A. Petrosjan
and V. V. Mazalov, 119 – 24, also Discussion Paper 256, Center
for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Download
(23) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2002):
“Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus”,
Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift
für Nationalökonomie 76, 217 – 46, Download
(22)
Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2002): “A note on an axiomatization of
the core of market games”, Mathematics
of Operations Research 27, 441 – 4, Download
(21)
Sudhölter, P., and J. Potters (2001): “The semireactive
bargaining set of a cooperative game”, International Journal of Game Theory 30, 117 – 39, Download
(20)
Sudhölter, P. (2001): “Equal treatment for both sides of assignment
games in the modified least core”, in Power Indices and Coalition
Formation, ed. by M. Holler and G. Owen, 175 – 202, Boston, Dordrecht,
London. Kluwer Academic Publishers; also Homo Oeconomicus
XIX (2002), 413 – 37, Download
(19) Hwang,
Y.-A., and P. Sudhölter (2000): “Axiomatizations of the core on the
universal domain and other natural domains”, International Journal of Game Theory 29, 597 – 623, Download
(18)
Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2000): “The positive prekernel of a cooperative game”, International Game Theory Review 2, 287
– 305, Download
(17)
Sudhölter, P., J. Rosenmüller, and B. Peleg (2000): “The
canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II – Representation”,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 33,
299 – 338, Download
(16)
Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2000): “Nucleoli as maximizers of
collective satisfaction functions: Erratum”, Social Choice and Welfare 17, 379 – 80, Download (see
(11))
(15) Peleg,
B., and P. Sudhölter (1999): “Single-peakedness
and coalition-proofness”, Review of
Economic Design 4, 381 – 7, Download
(14)
Potters, J., and P. Sudhölter (1999): “Airport problems and
consistent solution rules”, Mathematical
Social Sciences 38, 83 – 102, Download
(13) Peleg,
B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1999): “The canonical
extensive form of a game form: Part I – Symmetries”, in Current
Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications, Studies in Economic Theory 8, ed.
by A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis, and N.C. Yannelis, 367 – 87, Springer Publishers; also
Discussion Paper 186, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Download
(12) Sudhölter,
P. (1998): “Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output
cost sharing problems”, Games and
Economic Behavior 24, 142 – 71, Download
(11)
Sudhölter, P. and B. Peleg (1998): “Nucleoli as maximizers of
collective satisfaction functions”, Social
Choice and Welfare 15, 383 – 411, Download (see
(16))
(10)
Sudhölter, P. (1998): “Nonlinear self-dual solutions for
TU-games”, in Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations
Research, ed. by T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan,
D. Ray, and A. Sen, 33 – 50, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Download of a
private version
(9)
Sudhölter, P. (1997): “The modified nucleolus: Properties and
axiomatizations”, International
Journal of Game Theory 26, 147 – 82, Download
(8) Peleg,
B., and P. Sudhölter (1997): “An axiomatization of Nash equilibria
in economic situations”, Games and
Economic Behavior 18, 277 – 85, Download
(7)
Sudhölter, P. (1996): “Star-shapedness of
the kernel for homogeneous games”, Mathematical
Social Sciences 32, 179 – 214, Download
(6)
Sudhölter, P. (1996): “The modified nucleolus as canonical
representation of weighted majority games”, Mathematics of Operations Research 21, 734 – 56, Download
(5) Krohn, I., and P. Sudhölter (1995): “Directed
and weighted majority games”, ZOR–Mathematical
Methods of Operations Research 42, 189 – 216, Download
(4) Peleg,
B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1994): “The kernel of homogeneous
games with steps”, in Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler,
ed. by N. Megiddo, 163 – 92, Springer, Download
(3) Rosenmüller,
J., and P. Sudhölter (1994): “The nucleolus of homogeneous games
with steps”, Discrete Applied
Mathematics 50, 53 – 76, Download
(2) Krohn, I., S. Moltzahn, J.
Rosenmüller, P. Sudhölter, and H.-M. Wallmeier
(1991): “Implementing the modified LH-algorithm”, Applied Mathematics and Computation 45,
31 – 72, Download
(1)
Sudhölter, P. (1989): “Homogeneous games as anti
step functions”, International
Journal of Game Theory 18, 433 – 69, Download
Monographs:
(2) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2007): Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Second extended
edition, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 330 pp.
(1) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2003): Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and
Decision Library, Series C, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston/Dordrecht/London, 378 pp.
Other Publications:
(4) Peters. H., and P. Sudhölter (2019): “Professor Bezalel
Peleg (1936–2019)”, Social
Choice and Welfare 53, 155 – 7, Download
(3) Tornøe
Platz, T., P. Sudhölter, J. M. Zarzuelo, and L. P. Østerdal
(2018): “Preface to the Special Issue
on Game Theory and Economic Applications”, International Game Theory Review 20, 1802001, 2 pp., Download
(2)
Sudhölter, P. (2016): “Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra
related to set functions, games and capacities”, TOP 24, 333 – 334, Download
(1) Peters, H., and
P. Sudhölter (2012): “Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography”, International Journal of Game Theory 41,
915 – 939, Download
Special Issues Edited:
(2) Tornøe Platz,
T., P. Sudhölter, J. M. Zarzuelo, and L. P. Østerdal
(2018): Issue 3 (on Game Theory and Economic Applications) of International Game Theory Review, Volume
20
(1) Peters, H., and P. Sudhölter (2012): Issue 4 (in honor of
Bezalel Peleg) of International Journal
of Game Theory, Volume 41
Working and Discussion Papers:
(6) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2021):
“On manipulability in financial systems”, Discussion
Paper 8/2021, Department of Economics, University of Southern
Denmark, 39 pp.
(5) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P.
Sudhölter (2019): “Welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing
problems and convex games”, Discussion
Paper 6/2019, Department of Business and Economics,
University of Southern Denmark, 24 pp.
(4) Peleg,
B., and P. Sudhölter (2004): “Bargaining sets of voting
games”, Discussion Paper 376, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, 10 pp., Download
(3) Sudhölter, P. (1994): “Solution concepts for C-convex,
assignment, and M2-games”, Working Paper 232, Institute of Mathematical Economics,
University of Bielefeld, 28 pp, Download
(2) Sudhölter, P. (1993): “Independence for characterizing axioms of
the pre-nucleolus”, Working Paper 220, Institute of Mathematical
Economics, University of Bielefeld, 12 pp., Download
(1) Sudhölter, P. (1986): “Construction of homogeneous zero-sum
games”, Working Paper 144, Institute of Mathematical Economics,
University of Bielefeld, 43 pp., Download
Theses:
(3) Sudhölter, P. (1993): The Modified Nucleolus of a Cooperative Game.
Habilitation Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Bielefeld, 80 pp.
(2) Sudhölter, P. (1988): Classification of Homogeneous Games. Doctoral
Thesis (PhD Thesis), Department of Mathematics, University of Bielefeld, 105
pp.
(1) Kurth, P. R., and P.
Sudhölter (1982): Selbstinjektive darstellungsendliche
Algebren vom Typ Bn.
Diploma Thesis,
Department of Mathematics, University of Bielefeld, 191 pp.