LIST OF PUBLICATIONS (updated September 2021)

NOTE: Downloading, copying, or printing for, or on behalf of, any for-profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose should not be done without the explicit permission of the corresponding publisher.


Refereed Publications:

(57) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2021): “Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness”, forthcoming in Mathematical Programming, revised version of Discussion Paper 6/2020, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 20 pp.

 

(56) Dietzenbacher, B., and P. Sudhölter (2021): “Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games”, online in the International Journal of Game Theory, 17 pp., Download

 

(55) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2021): “Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 95, 102477 (10 pp.), Download

 

(54) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2021): “Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems”, Mathematical Social Sciences 109, 45 – 51, Download

 

(53) Hokari, T., Y. Funaki, and P. Sudhölter (2020): “Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games”, Review of Economic Design 24, 187 – 197, Download

 

(52) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2020): “Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without consistency”,  Mathematics of Operations Research 45, 1056 – 68, Download

 

(51) Litan, C., F. Marhuenda, and P. Sudhölter (2020): “Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms”, Annals of Operations Research 287, 801 – 10, Download

 

(50) Gottschalk Marling, T., T. M. Range, P. Sudhölter, and L. P. Østerdal (2018): “Decomposing bivariate dominance for social welfare comparisons”, Mathematical Social Sciences 95, 1 – 8, Download

 

(49) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2018): “On a class of vertices of the core”, Games and Economic Behavior 108, 541 – 57, Download

 

(48) Sudhölter, P., and J. M. Zarzuelo (2017): “Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods”, European Journal of Operational Research 260, 161 – 70, Download

 

(47) Kleppe, J., H. Reijnierse, and P. Sudhölter (2016): “Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions”, Annals of Operations Research 243, 37 – 53, Download

 

(46) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2016): “Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints”, International Journal of Game Theory 45, 269 – 90, Download

 

(45) Albizuri, M. J., and P. Sudhölter (2016): “Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures”, Social Choice and Welfare 46, 451 – 75, Download

 

(44) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2015): “On bargaining sets of convex NTU games”, International Game Theory Review 17, 1550008 (7 pp.), Download

 

(43) Litan, C., F. Marhuenda, and P. Sudhölter (2015): “Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 60, 28 – 32, Download

 

(42) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2014): “On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices”, European Journal of Operational Research 35, 709 – 17, Download

 

(41) Derks, J., H. Peters, and P. Sudhölter (2014): “On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games”, International Journal of Game Theory 43, 37 – 63, Download

 

(40) Khmelnitskaya, A., and P. Sudhölter (2013): “The prenucleolus and the prekernel for games with communication structures”, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 78, 285 – 99, Download

 

(39) Sudhölter, P., and J. M. Zarzuelo (2013): “Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points”, Games and Economic Behavior 80, 219 – 28, Download

 

(38) Grabisch, M., and P. Sudhölter (2012): “The bounded core for games with precedence constraints”, Annals of Operations Research 201, 251 – 64, Download

 

(37) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2012): “Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus”, International Journal of Game Theory 41, 809 – 28, Download

 

(36) Le Breton, M, P. Sudhölter, and V. Zaporozhets (2012): “Sequential legislative lobbying”, Social Choice and Welfare 39, 491 – 520, Download

 

(35) Peleg, B., P. Sudhölter, and J. M. Zarzuelo (2012): “On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games”, SERIEs 3, 143 – 56, Download

 

(34) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2010): “The positive core of a cooperative game”, International Journal of Game Theory 39, 113 – 36, Download

 

(33) Shellshear, E., and P. Sudhölter (2009): “On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability”, Games and Economic Behavior 67, 633 – 44, Download

 

(32) Holzman, R., B. Peleg, and P. Sudhölter (2007): “Bargaining sets of majority voting games”, Mathematics of Operations Research 32, 857 – 72, Download

 

(31) Hoffmann, M., and P. Sudhölter (2007): “The Shapley value of exact assignment games”, International Journal of Game Theory 35, 557 – 68, Download

 

(30) Raghavan, T. E. S., and P. Sudhölter (2006): “On assignment games”, in Advances in Dynamic Games with Applications to Economics, Management Science, Engineering, and Environmental Management, ed. by A. Haurie, S. Muto, L. A. Petrosjan, and T. E. S. Raghavan, vol. 8 of Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Birkhäuser, pp. 163 – 79, Download

 

(29) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “On bargaining sets and voting games”, in Proceedings of the Fourth Twente Workshop on Cooperative Games joint with the 3rd Dutch-Russian Symposium, CTIT, University of Twente, ed. by T.S.H. Driessen, J.B. Timmer, A.B. Khmelnitskaya, 89 – 104, Download

 

(28) Raghavan, T.E.S., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “The modiclus and core stability”, International Journal of Game Theory 33, 467 – 78, Download

 

(27) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2005): “On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 41, 1060 – 8, Download

 

(26) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2004): “Cartels via the modiclus”, Discrete Applied Mathematics 134, 263 – 302, Download

 

(25) Orshan, G., and P. Sudhölter (2003): “Reconfirming the prenucleolus”, Mathematics of Operations Research 28, 283 – 93, Download

 

(24) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2003): “The dummy paradox of the bargaining set”, International Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra 12, 443 – 6; also in Game Theory and Applications 8, ed. by L. A. Petrosjan and V. V. Mazalov, 119 – 24, also Discussion Paper 256, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Download

 

(23) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (2002): “Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus”, Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 76, 217 – 46, Download

 

(22) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2002): “A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games”, Mathematics of Operations Research 27, 441 – 4, Download

 

(21) Sudhölter, P., and J. Potters (2001): “The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game”, International Journal of Game Theory 30, 117 – 39, Download

 

(20) Sudhölter, P. (2001): “Equal treatment for both sides of assignment games in the modified least core”, in Power Indices and Coalition Formation, ed. by M. Holler and G. Owen, 175 – 202, Boston, Dordrecht, London. Kluwer Academic Publishers; also Homo Oeconomicus XIX (2002), 413 – 37, Download

 

(19) Hwang, Y.-A., and P. Sudhölter (2000): “Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains”, International Journal of Game Theory 29, 597 – 623, Download

 

(18) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2000): “The positive prekernel of a cooperative game”, International Game Theory Review 2, 287 – 305, Download

 

(17) Sudhölter, P., J. Rosenmüller, and B. Peleg (2000): “The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II – Representation”, Journal of Mathematical Economics 33, 299 – 338, Download

 

(16) Sudhölter, P., and B. Peleg (2000): “Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions: Erratum”, Social Choice and Welfare 17, 379 – 80, Download (see (11))

 

(15) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (1999): “Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness”, Review of Economic Design 4, 381 – 7, Download

 

(14) Potters, J., and P. Sudhölter (1999): “Airport problems and consistent solution rules”, Mathematical Social Sciences 38, 83 – 102, Download

 

(13) Peleg, B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1999): “The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part I – Symmetries”, in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications, Studies in Economic Theory 8, ed. by A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis, and N.C. Yannelis, 367 – 87, Springer Publishers; also Discussion Paper 186, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Download

 

(12) Sudhölter, P. (1998): “Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems”, Games and Economic Behavior 24, 142 – 71, Download

 

(11) Sudhölter, P. and B. Peleg (1998): “Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions”, Social Choice and Welfare 15, 383 – 411, Download (see (16))

 

(10) Sudhölter, P. (1998): “Nonlinear self-dual solutions for TU-games”, in Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research, ed. by T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, and A. Sen, 33 – 50, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Download of a private version

 

(9) Sudhölter, P. (1997): “The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations”, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 147 – 82, Download

 

(8) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (1997): “An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations”, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 277 – 85, Download

 

(7) Sudhölter, P. (1996): “Star-shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games”, Mathematical Social Sciences 32, 179 – 214, Download

 

(6) Sudhölter, P. (1996): “The modified nucleolus as canonical representation of weighted majority games”, Mathematics of Operations Research 21, 734 – 56, Download

 

(5) Krohn, I., and P. Sudhölter (1995): “Directed and weighted majority games”, ZOR–Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 42, 189 – 216, Download

 

(4) Peleg, B., J. Rosenmüller, and P. Sudhölter (1994): “The kernel of homogeneous games with steps”, in Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler, ed. by N. Megiddo, 163 – 92, Springer, Download

 

(3) Rosenmüller, J., and P. Sudhölter (1994): “The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps”, Discrete Applied Mathematics 50, 53 – 76, Download

 

(2) Krohn, I., S. Moltzahn, J. Rosenmüller, P. Sudhölter, and H.-M. Wallmeier (1991): “Implementing the modified LH-algorithm”, Applied Mathematics and Computation 45, 31 – 72, Download

 

(1) Sudhölter, P. (1989): “Homogeneous games as anti step functions”, International Journal of Game Theory 18, 433 – 69, Download


Monographs:
(2) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2007): Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Second extended edition, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 330 pp.

(1) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2003): Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, Series C, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London, 378 pp.

 

 

Other Publications:

(4) Peters. H., and P. Sudhölter (2019): “Professor Bezalel Peleg (1936–2019)”, Social Choice and Welfare 53, 155 – 7, Download

 

(3) Tornøe Platz, T., P. Sudhölter, J. M. Zarzuelo, and L. P. Østerdal (2018): “Preface to the Special Issue on Game Theory and Economic Applications”, International Game Theory Review 20, 1802001, 2 pp., Download

 

(2) Sudhölter, P. (2016): “Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities”, TOP 24, 333 – 334, Download

 

(1) Peters, H., and P. Sudhölter (2012): “Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography”, International Journal of Game Theory 41, 915 – 939, Download

 

 

Special Issues Edited:

(2) Tornøe Platz, T., P. Sudhölter, J. M. Zarzuelo, and L. P. Østerdal (2018): Issue 3 (on Game Theory and Economic Applications) of International Game Theory Review, Volume 20

 

(1) Peters, H., and P. Sudhölter (2012): Issue 4 (in honor of Bezalel Peleg) of International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 41

 

Working and Discussion Papers:

(5) Calleja, P., F. Llerena, and P. Sudhölter (2019): “Welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems and convex games”, Discussion Paper 6/2019, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 24 pp.

 

(4) Peleg, B., and P. Sudhölter (2004): “Bargaining sets of voting games”, Discussion Paper 376, Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 10 pp., Download

(3) Sudhölter, P. (1994): “Solution concepts for C-convex, assignment, and M2-games”, Working Paper 232, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, 28 pp, Download

(2) Sudhölter, P. (1993): “Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus”, Working Paper 220, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, 12 pp.,  Download

(1) Sudhölter, P. (1986): “Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games”, Working Paper 144, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, 43 pp., Download

Theses:
(3) Sudhölter, P. (1993): The Modified Nucleolus of a Cooperative Game. Habilitation Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Bielefeld, 80 pp.

(2) Sudhölter, P. (1988): Classification of Homogeneous Games. Doctoral Thesis (PhD Thesis), Department of Mathematics, University of Bielefeld, 105 pp.

(1) Kurth, P. R., and P. Sudhölter (1982): Selbstinjektive darstellungsendliche Algebren vom Typ Bn. Diploma Thesis, Department of Mathematics, University of Bielefeld, 191 pp.

CV

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